Group Knowledge by Tuomela, Raimo
  345
Group Knowledge 
Raimo Tuomela, Helsinki 
1. Introduction 
There is knowledge in groups or communities, e.g. in the 
scientific community, that such and such is the case, and 
that in some cases groups as groups know; and in all 
these cases there must be or have been actual knowers. 
Accordingly, there is knowledge available in social groups, 
and this knowledge can be “picked up” and had by 
individual members as knowledge. My main concern in this 
paper is to give an account of group beliefs and knowledge 
in the sense that the group members as a group believe or 
know something. A central case here is normatively 
binding group belief and knowledge. In such a case the 
group is obligated to reason and act on the truth of the 
content of the belief in question. I will assume that a group 
cannot know unless its members or at least some of them 
know the item in question. The general ground for this 
assumption is that group properties supervene on their 
members' relevant properties (see Tuomela 1995 Chapter 
6, for a discussion). A group's normatively binding belief 
concerning a topic will accordingly depend on its members, 
beliefs, indeed we-mode “acceptance” beliefs, about the 
topic and on their relevant "interconnections" concerning it. 
We-mode acceptance belief centrally involves the idea of 
functioning fully as a group member (see Tuomela 2002a, 
2003a for the we-mode). A member’s private or I-mode 
beliefs may differ from his relevant we-mode beliefs. 
In a group that knows qua a group a justifying group 
reason, amounting to a jointly accepted joint reason (thus 
a we-mode reason), for the acceptance and truth of p in 
the case of group knowledge is needed. Why? Briefly, 
knowledge (entailing justified true belief) guides group 
action and, indeed, does it more reliably than mere shared 
belief and, at least from the group’s point of view, even 
shared true belief. This also applies to the group case: The 
group can act as a group more successfully and reliably 
(from an objective point of view) as well as be more 
confident and take more risks (from its internal, "groupjec-
tive" point of view) in the case of group knowledge based 
on a jointly accepted reason than in the case of shared 
true belief or even shared I-mode knowledge by the 
members (cf. Tuomela, 2003, for detailed arguments for 
we-mode group reasons). Another point is that the group 
can also better argue for its view and defend itself in public 
when it has a good collectively accepted joint reason for its 
view than when it does not. (The joint reason can in an 
extreme case be a collectively accepted disjunction of the 
members’ private reasons.) 
Speaking of normatively binding group beliefs, there are 
two kinds of them: 1) group beliefs (viz. beliefs attributed to 
a group) concerning the external world (e.g. grass is 
green) and being at least partly dependent “upon the way 
the external world is”; 2) group beliefs are social and 
artificial in the sense that they are performatively created 
and that it is entirely up to the group members to decide 
about their truth or, rather, correctness. I will call group 
beliefs of kind 1) natural. As to 2), I will concentrate on its 
central subclass formed by constitutive institutional beliefs, 
based on collective acceptance. An example is given by 
the institutional case of money (e.g. the group accepts and 
thus believes that squirrel fur is money). I will concentrate 
on normatively binding group beliefs, where the normativity 
is based primarily on the fact that there are "operative" 
members for the group who have been authorized to make 
normatively binding decisions and agreements and/or to 
accept views for the group. The set of operative members 
may in the extreme case consist of all group members, in 
which case there need not be prior authorization.  
In the case of natural knowledge the group might err 
concerning the truth of the content of an item of knowledge 
and even concerning the justification it has concerning the 
acceptance of the content. Group discussion and, indeed, 
any method of justification may fall short of yielding truth in 
the case of natural belief. In contrast, in the (constitutive) 
institutional case the truth of the item p of knowledge and 
the justification of the group´s acceptance of p are both 
totally up to the group. Thus the criteria of justification are 
necessarily social. In the constitutive institutional case we 
can speak of performative truth, as the conceptual model 
for these institutional beliefs is collective performative 
speech acts. Suppose we, the group members, decide and 
thereby declare that squirrel fur is to be our money by 
representing in our actual use that squirrel fur is money. 
Then squirrel fur is money in our group, and our group 
knows it is money and describes it as money. In other 
cases less than explicit declaration will suffice as long as 
functionally right action is involved. 
In the case of natural belief there is in general mind-to-
world direction of fit (cf. Searle 1983 for the notion). This 
means in colloquial terms that the mind must be changed 
to fit the world. In contrast, in the case of constitutive 
institutional belief (e.g. squirrel fur is money) the direction 
of fit is world-to-mind. That is, when viewed as constitutive 
the belief in question has the world-to-mind direction of fit 
(in contrast to the case when it is viewed merely as 
expressing what the world is like according to its subject). 
Thus, in the constitutive case the world is to be changed 
and kept changed by the participants so that it fits their 
mind. However, the group is here also taken to have 
asserted the content in question, and thus the belief also 
has the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
The “operative” members who have formed the item of 
knowledge for the group actually have the knowledge (at 
least at the time of making the decision or agreement in 
question). The case with non-operative members, in con-
trast, may be like that of a stranger or an external obser-
ver. They may learn about the item of knowledge e.g. by 
testimony from someone (or from books) and thus have 
the source in question as their justified source of knowl-
edge. The content in question, say that squirrel fur is 
money in the group, is “quasi-objective” or, as we may say, 
“groupjective” knowledge (cf. Searle 1995). For external 
observers the knowledge that squirrel fur is money initially 
has the mind-to-world rather than the world-to-mind 
direction of fit of satisfaction (cf. above). 
2. Group knowledge 
Group knowledge involves group belief, in analogy with the 
individual case. I have elsewhere (in Tuomela 1992, 1995) 
given an account of group belief (in this case amounting 
basically to the group’s acceptance of p as true). Here I 
propose to elucidate epistemically justified normatively 
group-binding group belief: 
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(BG) Group g is justified in believing that p in the norma-
tive group-binding sense in the social and normative 
circumstances C if and only if in C there are (authorized) 
operative members A1,...,Am of g in respective positions 
P1,...,Pm such that  
(1) the agents A1,...,Am, when they were performing their 
social tasks in their positions P1,...,Pm and due to their 
exercising the relevant authority system („joint intention 
formation“ system) of g, 
(a) (intentionally) collectively accepted p as true 
or correctly assertable in g and because of this 
exercise of the authority system they ought to 
continue to accept and believe it positionally, 
thus in the we-mode (being collectively commit-
ted to p, which they have collectively accepted 
for g); and  
(b) p relates appropriately to the realm of con-
cern of the group and is epistemically justified for 
g in C; 
(2) there is mutual knowledge among the operative 
members A1,...,Am to the effect that (1); 
(3) because of (1a), the (full-fledged and adequately 
informed) non-operative members of g tend to tacitly 
accept -- or at least ought to accept -- p in the we-mode; 
(4) there is mutual knowledge in g to the effect that (3). 
My concise group-level analysis of epistemic group 
justification for the case dealt with by (BG) can be 
summarized in general terms as follows (cf. Tuomela 
2002b):  
(EJ) Proposition p is epistemically justified for group g (in 
a situation C) if and only if (in C) g accepts p in virtue of 
p fitting and being supported by (a) the data available to 
g and (b) the „semantical“ (viz. world-language, lan-
guage-language, and language-world) rules accepted by 
g.  
Clause (b) is to be understood in terms of the scientific 
method and hence conduciveness to informative truth, 
understanding the semantical rules here more or less in a 
Sellarsian way (cf. Sellars 1968, Tuomela 1985). (EJ) can 
clearly accommodate not only natural group beliefs (best 
covered by the phrasing) but also constitutive institutional 
group beliefs. In the latter case the central element in (b) is 
a constitutive rule such as “squirrel fur counts as money”.  
My present analysis of "positional" group knowledge is 
compatible with the possibility that a group member may 
be justified in the I-mode without the group being justified.: 
A joint reason might be missing. For instance, the 
constitutive goals and standards (etc.) of the group might 
simply prohibit the kind of I-mode or private justification 
that the group member has for his belief that p. (Even all 
group members might be justified without the group 
rationally having a joint reason – cf. cases requiring com-
promises.) Conversely, the group might be justified in its 
acceptance that p even if some members (e.g. non-ope-
rative members) are not, and might privately have good 
reasons against the truth of the content in question, but 
just go along with what the operative members have 
accepted. (Cf. Schmitt 1994, for resembling points.)  
To arrive at an elucidation of group knowledge that p, I 
propose, in contrast to Longino 2002, that the truth of p 
(or, more generally, correct assertability) also needs to be 
required, for the group might be wrong no matter how 
good reasons it takes itself to have. In addition, there must 
be a condition blocking Gettier-type paradoxes. Without 
further discussion, I adopt Pollock’s 1987, p. 181, formu-
lation for this condition. So we get: 
(KG) g knows that p in the normative group-binding 
sense in the social and normative circumstances C if 
and only if in C (i) g believes that p in the normatively 
group-binding sense and p is not only groupjectively but 
also epistemically justified (in g), (ii) p is true or correctly 
assertable (for g), and (iii) there is no true proposition, q, 
such that were g to believe that q it would not any more 
be epistemically justified in believing that p.  
It follows from (KG)) -- given the entailed clause (1)(b) of 
(BG) -- that the operative members must know that p and 
indeed generally mutually we-know that p in the we-mode 
(but they need not know it also in the I-mode). However, 
the non-operative members might not know that p, despite 
being obligated to knowing.  
Not all group beliefs are normatively group-binding in the 
above sense. Let us still consider weaker kinds of group 
knowledge that fall into four categories I – IV (cf. Tuomela 
2003b.) I will do it concisely in terms of some examples as 
follows: 
(1) The Catholic Church believes that miracles happen. 
(Category I: Normatively group-binding, viz. based on 
group obligation, with supporting I-mode beliefs had by 
the group members)  
(2) The Communist Party of Ruritania believes that 
capitalist countries will soon perish, but none of its 
members really believes so. (Category I: Normatively 
group-binding but not backed by personal, I-mode 
beliefs) 
(3) This group believes that Smith is a traitor. (Category 
II: Weakly normatively group-binding as the leaders 
have led the others to believe that they ought to treat 
Smith as a traitor, which resulted in collective commit-
ment) 
(4) The team believes that it will win today’s game. 
(Category III: Non-normative, the case is assumed still to 
be group-binding, because of based on a joint plan 
which is personally accepted in a non-normative, thin 
sense by the participants and which involves collective 
commitment but no group-obligation) 
(5) Finns believe that sauna originated in Finland. 
(Category IV: Non-normative and non-binding; this kind 
of shared we-belief is what Gallup investigations study). 
The most typical group beliefs seem to be the normatively 
group-binding group beliefs in the sense of category I and 
the non-normative beliefs in the sense of category III. We 
have: 
(KGG) g knows that p as a group in C if and only if in C 
(a) g believes that p in one of the senses I-III ; (b) p is 
epistemically justified (for g), and (c) p is true or correctly 
assertable (for g). 
Here the phrase ‘as a group’ primarily means that the 
group members are collectively committed to p for the 
group.* 
 
* I wish to thank Markus Lammenranta for comments. 
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